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ARGUMENT
I.

Reciprocal Discipline Is Not Limited to Sanctions of Identical or
Lesser Severity
Welker's Brief offers a definition of "equivalent" in support of his argument

that the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability ("RLDD") limit a District Court to
imposing equivalent or less severe discipline in cases of reciprocal discipline.
Instead, the focus of the analysis should be on the word "reciprocal."
The word "reciprocal" denotes something owed mutually—in this instance,
discipline owed by one jurisdiction predicated upon that imposed by another.
The policy reasons for permitting reciprocal discipline are obvious and sound.
The purpose of lawyer discipline proceedings "is to ensure and maintain the high
standard of professional conduct required of those who undertake the discharge
of professional responsibilities as lawyers and to protect the public and the
administration of justice from those who have demonstrated by their conduct that
they

are

unable

responsibilities."

or

unlikely

to

Rule 1(a), RLDD.

properly

discharge

their

professional

Reciprocal discipline is necessary to

discharge these goals, and does so without the burden and expense of
independent proceedings.

The rule also prevents an attorney who has

committed professional misconduct resulting in sanction by one jurisdiction from
avoiding its effects simply by moving to another state.
By the same token, jurisdictions must be free to impose the discipline that
would be warranted there.

If it were otherwise, the jurisdiction's disciplinary

powers would be limited by what is deemed appropriate elsewhere.

It would

mean that the consequences for an attorney's serious misconduct elsewhere

would not necessarily result in the sanction that likely would be imposed were the
misconduct committed here.

Such a result is inconsistent with the RLDD's

directive that "These rules shall be construed so as to achieve substantial justice
and fairness in disciplinary matters . . . ."

Rule 1(c), RLDD.

Indeed, the

Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions ("Standards") are designed to promote
"consistency in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions for the same or similar
offenses within and among jurisdictions." Rule 1.3, Standards.
These goals are not furthered by Welker's restrictive interpretation of the
reciprocal discipline rule.

Instead, as Welker would have it, if a respondent

commits an offense warranting disbarment in Utah, she can nevertheless avoid
that sanction so long as she is prosecuted first in another jurisdiction and
receives a lesser discipline there.

This approach inadequately protects the

public, and produces an unfair result for attorneys found to have committed the
same or similar offenses in Utah.
II.

Utah's Reciprocal Discipline Rule Comports With Due Process
Requirements
Utah's reciprocal discipline rule affords respondents an opportunity to

demonstrate that the procedure in the other jurisdiction "was so lacking in notice
or opportunity to he heard as to constitute a deprivation of due process." Rule
22(d)(1), RLDD.

This is important because a final adjudication elsewhere

conclusively establishes the misconduct. Welker did not allege that California's
procedures deprived him of notice or opportunity to be heard such that it
amounted to a deprivation of due process.

2

Utah's reciprocal discipline rule provides for notice of the

Utah

proceedings, and gives respondents an opportunity to be heard. Notice that the
OPC would seek reciprocal discipline was afforded Welker when the OPC filed
and served upon him its Petition for Reciprocal Discipline.

(R. 1-36) The

language of the rule itself, a copy of which was sent to Welker by the OPC,
conveys notice that there may be a departure from the discipline imposed
elsewhere if "the misconduct established warrants substantially

different

discipline in this state or is not misconduct in this jurisdiction." Rule 22(d)(3),
RLDD.
In any event, Welker had actual notice that the OPC would seek a more
severe sanction than what was imposed in California when it stated in its Petition
served upon Welker that: "The OPC believes and therefore alleges that Welker's
misconduct warrants substantially different and greater discipline in this State,
under Utah[ ]'s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions." (R. 1-36 U 10) The
OPC also filed and served a memorandum demonstrating that disbarment is the
appropriate sanction in Utah for misconduct of the type committed by Welker.
(R. 56-65) Welker thus had ample actual notice.
The rule also provides for an opportunity to be heard: respondents are
given the right to inform OPC counsel of any claim that the imposition of
equivalent discipline would be unwarranted, and state the reasons therefor. See
Rule 22(b), RLDD. The District Court permitted the parties to brief their
respective positions,1 and Welker was also "heard" in the District Court hearing
1

Welker also filed two affidavits of fact (R. 50-53, 74-78) that the District Court
read and considered in making its decision. (R. 95)
3

the court conducted before deciding this matter.

Welker thus had ample

opportunity to, and did, present his argument that identical discipline was
appropriate. He presented the argument in a Memorandum (R. 43-46) and in a
Reply Memorandum (R. 70-73), and through oral argument. Significantly, Welker
never contended until this matter was on appeal that Utah's reciprocal discipline
rule is constitutionally flawed for failure to provide him notice that he might
receive a more severe discipline than that which he received in California.
III.

Welker's Assertion That No Other Respondent In a Reciprocal
Discipline Proceeding Has Received Increased Discipline Is
Unsupported and Not Germain to the Disposition of This Case
Welker's Brief asserts in three places words to the effect that "No lawyer in

the State of Utah has ever received a more severe penalty in Utah than he or she
received in another jurisdiction." Brief of Appellee at 5, 4, 1. He offers no factual
basis for making this assertion.
The OPC can neither affirm nor dispute Welker's contention, but observes
that the RLDD were adopted in 1993, and prior to that, disciplinary proceedings
were conducted by the Ethics and Discipline Committee with review and approval
by the Bar Commission, and recommendations made to this Court concerning
sanctions.

See Summary, RLDD.

The disciplinary proceedings model has

changed significantly in the last decade, and to date, very few reciprocal
discipline cases have been brought in District Court and the OPC is not aware of
any that have been appealed to this Court. Welker's contention therefore could
not have much foundation in a procedurally similar context.

4

Additionally, Welker offers no case-by-case comparison of reciprocal
discipline cases that would demonstrate that increased sanctions either were
warranted but not sought by the OPC, or imposed by the District Court. Welker's
unsupported assertions therefore lend no support to his argument that he should
not receive a sanction more harsh than what was imposed in California.
CONCLUSION
The District Court erred in concluding that Rule 22, RLDD, restricts it to
imposing identical discipline in a reciprocal discipline case.

For purposes of

reciprocal disciplinary proceedings in this state, "a final adjudication of the other
court . . . that a respondent has been guilty of misconduct shall establish
conclusively the misconduct." Welker's many serious instances of professional
misconduct warrant disbarment under Utah law, and that is the sanction that
should be imposed.
DATED: December

\^T

, 2003.
OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

Kate A. Toomey
Deputy Counsel
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